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INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the Federal Circuit again championed the First Amendment
and the freedom of trademark owners to register marks that the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) had previously deemed unfit to
print. The court fully embraced the Supreme Court’s unanimous
affirmation of its 2015 In re Tam1 decision,2 which had declared the
Lanham Act’s ban on disparaging marks under section 2(a) to be a First
Amendment violation.3 In December, the Federal Circuit’s In re Brunetti
4
decision struck a second blow to section 2(a) by deeming its ban on
“immoral” or “scandalous” marks unconstitutional.5 The Federal Circuit
also issued ten other trademark decisions6 in 2017,7 which, as with prior
years, represented less than three percent of its total docket.8 However,
as discussed below, these decisions—which range from holding that the
standard for awarding attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act is the same
1. 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
2. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
3. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1335.
4. 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
5. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1356.
6. This Article uses the term “trademark decisions” to refer primarily to decisions
that substantively address claims under the Lanham (Trademark) Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051–1141n. Practitioners should be aware that this Article is a survey only of the
2017 trademark decisions issued by the Federal Circuit that substantively address
trademark issues and that other opinions issued by the Federal Circuit in 2017 may also
impact trademark law practice but are not considered or discussed herein. For a
summary of 2016 trademark decisions, see Anita B. Polott & Rachel E. Fertig, 2016
Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1411 (2018).
7. In re Latindo, 712 F. App’x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam); In re
I.AM.Symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt,
Inc., 864 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Lyons, DVM v. Am. Coll. of Veterinary Sports
Med. & Rehab., 859 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 366 (2017);
Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (per curiam); Milo & Gabby LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 693 F. App’x 879 (Fed.
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 335 (2017); In re DDMB, Inc., 681 F. App’x 919 (Fed.
Cir. 2017); In re Driven Innovations, Inc., 674 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
8. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILED, BY CATEGORY: FY 2017
(2018), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/FY_17_Filings
_by_Category.pdf.
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as that under the Patent Act9 to articulating a three-factor test to
determine ownership of a mark10—are likely to significantly impact the
practice of trademark law for years to come.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES

The court issued eleven decisions addressing substantive trademark
issues in 2017, including one—Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.
(Romag II )11—that was a reinstatement from a 2016 decision. Each of
these decisions is summarized below.
A. Prohibition of Immoral or Scandalous Matter: In re Brunetti
In In re Brunetti, the Federal Circuit held that the provision of
section 2(a) of the Lanham Act prohibiting registration of a trademark
that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous
matter” was an unconstitutional restriction on the freedom of speech.12
The appellant, Erik Brunetti, owned a clothing brand called FUCT.13
In 2011, the USPTO refused registration of Mr. Brunetti’s application
under section 2(a), contending that the mark was scandalous because it was
a variation of the word “fucked.”14 Mr. Brunetti requested reconsideration
and filed an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB or
“the Board”).15 The Board affirmed the original examiner’s decision to
reject the mark for vulgarity and denied Mr. Brunetti’s request for
reconsideration, noting that the FUCT mark was the phonetic equivalent
of the vulgar word “fucked.”16
Mr. Brunetti appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit,
advancing three arguments: (1) there was not substantial evidence to
support the Board’s finding that the mark was vulgar; (2) even if the court
found the mark to be vulgar, section 2(a) only prohibited immoral or

9. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag II), 686 F. App’x 889, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
10. Lyons, 859 F.3d at 1029.
11. 686 F. App’x 889 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1357.
13. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1337.
14. Id. The USPTO rejects a mark when it finds that a “‘substantial composite of the
general public’ would find the mark scandalous.” Id. at 1336. If a mark is vulgar it is
scandalous. Id. The USPTO defines vulgar as “lacking in taste, indelicate, [and] morally
crude.” Id. (alteration in original). Examining attorneys take “the context of the
marketplace as applied to only the goods described in the application” and
“contemporary attitudes” into account when deciding whether a mark is scandalous. Id.
15. Id. at 1337.
16. Id.
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scandalous marks, not vulgar marks; and (3) section 2(a)’s prohibition of
“immoral or scandalous marks” was unconstitutional.17 The Federal
Circuit disposed of Mr. Brunetti’s first argument, determining that there
existed substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that a
“‘substantial composite’ of the American public” would determine that
the trademark FUCT was vulgar.18 The court also rejected Mr.
Brunetti’s second argument, holding that the USPTO can prove that a
mark is scandalous by showing that it is vulgar.19
The court focused on Mr. Brunetti’s third argument: in light of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Matal v. Tam20—which held
unconstitutional the section 2(a) provision that barred registration of
disparaging marks—the prohibition on registering immoral or
scandalous marks also violated the First Amendment.21 Analyzing
section 2(a) as a possible content-based restriction, the court began by
noting that such restrictions prohibit speech discussing a particular
topic or conveying a particular message.22 Content-based restrictions
are unconstitutional unless they survive strict scrutiny review, meaning
that the government must prove the restriction is narrowly tailored to
further a compelling government interest.23
The government conceded that section 2(a)’s ban on immoral or
scandalous material was a content-based restriction.24 Moreover, the
government did not argue that section 2(a) survived strict scrutiny
review.25 Rather, the government argued that the First Amendment did
not apply in the context of trademark registrations because it was “a
government subsidy program or limited public forum.”26 Alternatively,
the government argued that trademarks were purely commercial speech,
implicating the less exacting intermediate level of scrutiny.27
The court ultimately rejected the government’s argument that
trademark registration is a government subsidy28 because it found that
trademark registration does not implicate Congress’s power to spend
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 1339.
Id.
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1340.
Id. at 1341–42 (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)).
Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1344.
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funds, which is a prerequisite for a government subsidy program.29
Further, the court found that trademark registration is not a limited
public forum because unlike limited public forums that have been
recognized in the past, trademark registration is not tethered to
government property.30 As for the government’s alternative theory that
trademark registration is commercial speech subject to only intermediate
scrutiny, the court noted that while trademarks include elements of
commercial speech, they also often have expressive content and therefore
cannot be characterized as purely commercial speech.31
Because the government’s attempts to recast section 2(a)’s
prohibition of immoral or scandalous matter failed, the constitutionality
of this provision was assessed under strict scrutiny review and did not
survive that rigorous standard.32 In dicta, the court noted that the
prohibition would not have even survived a less rigorous intermediate
scrutiny analysis.33 Thus, the court held that section 2(a)’s ban on
immoral or scandalous marks was an unconstitutional content-based
restriction.34 The Federal Circuit’s decision was not appealed by the
government, making Brunetti a final decision.
B. Willfulness Requirement to Recover Infringer’s Profits: Romag
Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. ( Romag II)
On March 27, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Romag
Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag I )35 and simultaneously vacated the
Federal Circuit’s decision.36 The Court remanded the case to the
Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in SCA
Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC.37
In a per curiam order on May 3, 2017, the Federal Circuit in Romag II
reinstated the section of its Romag I decision holding that the Second
Circuit’s willfulness requirement for claiming a trademark infringer’s profits

29. Id.
30. Id. at 1347–48.
31. Id. at 1348–49.
32. Id. at 1349.
33. Id. at 1355.
34. Id. at 1357.
35. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., (Romag I) 817 F.3d 782 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1373 (2017).
36. Romag Fasteners, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1373.
37. 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017) (holding that laches cannot be used as a defense against
patent infringement claims brought within the statutory period); Romag Fasteners, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. at 1373.
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remains good law.38 The Federal Circuit reasoned that such reinstatement
was proper given the Supreme Court’s direction to reconsider the Romag I
decision in light of SCA Hygiene, which “was solely concerned with the
defense of laches against a claim for patent infringement damages” and
therefore had no effect on the relevant trademark aspects of the Romag I
decision.39 The Federal Circuit’s reinstatement of the trademark aspects of
Romag I has not been further appealed.
C. Attorneys’ Fees Under the Lanham Act: Romag Fasteners, Inc. v.
Fossil, Inc. ( Romag III)
In Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag III ),40 the Federal Circuit
vacated and remanded the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees
under the Lanham Act, holding that the Lanham Act has the same
standard for recovering attorneys’ fees as the Patent Act.41
After the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment from the district
court that Fossil had engaged in patent and trademark infringement in
Romag II,42 Romag sought attorneys’ fees under the Patent Act, Lanham
Act, and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).43
However, the district court only granted fees under the Patent Act and
CUTPA, determining that the Lanham Act had a more stringent
standard for awarding attorneys’ fees that was not met.44
With respect to the Patent Act, the district court applied the more
lenient Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.45 standard in
analyzing whether a case is “exceptional,” allowing for the recovery of
attorneys’ fees.46 In Octane, the Supreme Court held that an exceptional
case under the Patent Act is one that, given the totality of the

38. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 785, 789.
39. Romag II, 686 F. App’x 889, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2017). On August 9, 2017, the
Federal Circuit issued its revised opinion on the patent issue involved in Romag I in
light the SCA Hygiene decision. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag III), 866
F.3d 1330, 1333 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
40. 866 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
41. Id. at 1333, 1336. The Federal Circuit also addressed whether the district court
erred in awarding fees under the Patent Act and whether the district court erred in
ruling that Romag’s 50(a) motion precluded a finding that Fossil’s noninfringement
position was frivolous. Id. at 1336, 1341. Those issues are beyond the scope of this
Article and will not be discussed.
42. Romag II, 686 F. App’x at 890.
43. Romag III, 866 F.3d at 1333.
44. Id.
45. 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
46. Romag III, 866 F.3d at 1334.
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circumstances, is distinct from others in the considerable strength of a
party’s litigating position or the unreasonable way in which the case was
litigated.47 Applying that standard, the district court found that Romag
was entitled to attorneys’ fees under section 285 of the Patent Act because
Fossil did not withdraw defenses it had made until after trial and because
it considered Fossil’s invalidity defense to be close to frivolous.48
With respect to the Lanham Act, the district court applied the more
stringent standard from the Second Circuit regarding the Lanham Act’s
fee-shifting provision, which only allows for recovery of attorneys’ fees
“on evidence of fraud or bad faith.”49 Because the district court did not
find bad faith, fraud, or willfulness on the part of the defendants, it
determined that the case was not exceptional within the meaning of the
Lanham Act.50 Fossil appealed the award of fees under the Patent Act
and Romag cross-appealed the denial of fees under the Lanham Act.51
The Federal Circuit in this case reviewed the district court’s grant of
attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion.52 In addressing Romag’s
contention that the district court erred in not awarding attorneys’ fees
under the Lanham Act, the Federal Circuit considered whether the
Octane standard should apply to the award of fees under the Lanham
Act. It concluded that it should, based on the identical language in both
Acts for attorneys’ fees and the legislative history of the Lanham Act’s
fee-shifting provision.53 In addition, the court noted that although the
Second Circuit had not adopted the Octane standard for Lanham Act
cases, many other circuits had.54
As a result, the case was remanded to the district court to consider
47. Id. at 1333 (citing Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756).
48. Id. at 1334 (finding that Fossil’s non-infringement position was not frivolous
enough to justify an award of fees, but nevertheless concluding that Romag was
entitled to attorney’s fees under the Patent Act because: (1) Fossil failed to withdraw
its defenses with prejudice during the trial; (2) Fossil made an invalidity defense that
bordered on frivolous; and (3) Romag was already penalized enough for its conduct).
49. Id. (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 111 (2d
Cir. 2012)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1334–35.
54. Id. The court noted that since Octane was handed down, the Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had all held that the Octane court sent a “clear message”
that the term “exceptional” was defined for the fee provision in both the Patent Act
and the Lanham Act. Id. at 1335 (citing several circuit court decisions to emphasize
that no circuit has declined to apply the Octane standard to the Lanham Act after
specifically considering the case).
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Lanham Act and the Patent Act attorneys’ fees and to evaluate whether
an award of fees is appropriate given the correct analysis under Octane.55
D. Distinctiveness
Genericness: In re Magnesita Refractories Co.
Among the substantive trademark decisions issued by the Federal
Circuit in 2017 was an analysis of genericness in In re Magnesita
Refractories Co.56 In that case, the court affirmed the TTAB’s refusal to
register the mark MAGNESITA because the term (and its English
equivalents “magnesia” and “magnesite”) identified key components in
refractory products. The Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence
supported the TTAB’s determination that the term was generic as
applied to refractory products in Class 19 and highly descriptive as to
online information services for refractory products in Class 37.57
In November 2009, Magnesita Refractories Co. (“MRC”) first filed an
application for the mark MAGNESITA based on its bona fide intention to
use the mark in commerce under section 1(b) of the Lanham Act.58 The
examining attorney applied the doctrine of foreign equivalents, under
which an examiner may consider whether the English equivalent to the
mark would be generic or descriptive. An examiner may apply this
doctrine when the mark is comprised of a foreign word from a language
familiar to an appreciable segment of American consumers.59 The
examining attorney found that “magnesia” and “magnesite”—translations
of MAGNESITA—were components of refractory products and thus were
merely descriptive of MRC’s goods and services.60 Following the refusal,
MRC attempted to amend the application to claim acquired
distinctiveness under section 2(f) based on five years of substantially
exclusive and continuous use of the mark in commerce.61 The examining
1.

55. Id. at 1341–42. Similar to the Lanham Act attorney fees’ claim, the court found
that the district court erred in declining to consider Romag’s earlier litigation
misconduct when awarding attorneys’ fees under the Patent Act. Id. at 1340.
56. No. 2016-2345, 2017 WL 5664747 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 27, 2017).
57. Id. at *2–3.
58. In re Magnesita Refractories Co., Nos. 77873477, 85834316, 2016 WL 10571037,
at *1 (T.T.A.B. May 17, 2016) (explaining that MRC sought to register the word
MAGNESITA as a standard character mark by filing Application Serial No. 77,873,477
with the Patent and Trademark Office), aff’d, 2017 WL 5664747.
59. In re Magnesita Refractories Co., 2017 WL 5664747, at *1.
60. Id.
61. Id. at *2–3.
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attorney rejected this amendment.62 The examining attorney also
rejected a subsequent amendment to register the Class 19 goods on the
supplemental register on the basis that the mark was generic; however,
she accepted the amendment for MRC’s goods in Class 37, concluding
that the mark was merely descriptive for those services.63
In January 2013, MRC filed another application seeking to register
the mark MAGNESITA in Classes 19 and 37 with an asserted first use
in October 2008 and a claim, supported by evidence of advertising and
sales, that the mark had acquired distinctiveness.64 The examining
attorney found the mark to be generic or highly descriptive for the
refractory products in Class 19 for the same reasons set forth in the
refusal of the initial application, and the attorney found the mark to
be highly descriptive for the services claimed in Class 37.65 The
examining attorney denied the application in both classes, finding that
the evidence of use that MRC had provided, including three-and-a-half
years of gross sales numbers and an article about MRC’s acquisition of
a U.S. refractory products company, was not sufficient to show that
MAGNESITA distinctively indicated MRC as the source for the appliedfor refractory products and services.66
MRC appealed both denials to the Board, which consolidated the
claims and affirmed the examiner’s opinion that MAGNESITA was
generic for the goods claimed in Class 19 and that MRC had failed to
show acquired distinctiveness for both the Class 19 goods and Class 37
services claimed in the second application.67 The Board held that
because the mark was highly descriptive with respect to the Class 37
services, more evidence was necessary to confirm acquired
distinctiveness.68
MRC appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit.69 The
Federal Circuit first disposed of MRC’s argument that after B & B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.,70 the court should reconsider the
62. Id. at *2.
63. Id.
64. In re Magnesita Refractories Co., 2016 WL 10571037, at *2 (explaining that MRC
filed Application Serial No. 85,834,316 with the Patent and Trademark Office as a usebased application under section 1(a) of the Trademark Act).
65. In re Magnesita Refractories Co., 2017 WL 5664747, at *2.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *2–3.
68. Id. at *3.
69. Id.
70. 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) (holding that the party opposing registration bears the
burden of proof).
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burden of proof on the applicant to show acquired distinctiveness.71
The court rejected that argument, explaining that “B & B Hardware does
not address the evidentiary burdens involved in ex parte proceedings.”72
The court then affirmed that the evidence showing that magnesite and
magnesia were key components in refractory products was sufficient to
support the determination that the mark MAGNESITA was generic with
respect to the goods in Class 19.73
The Federal Circuit then considered the application for MAGNESITA
in Class 37, which asserted acquired distinctiveness.74 The court
acknowledged that the Lanham Act specifically provides the Board
discretion regarding whether to find acquired distinctiveness based
solely on five years of substantially exclusive and continuous use of a
mark in commerce.75 The court highlighted the statutory language
providing that the Board “may” accept that evidence as prima facie
evidence of distinctiveness.76 The court further explained that the
descriptiveness of MAGNESITA’s Class 37 services created “an elevated
burden to show acquired distinctiveness,” which MRC did not meet.77
Descriptiveness: In re Driven Innovations, Inc.
The Federal Circuit’s In re Driven Innovations, Inc.78 decision addressed
whether the mark DOTBLOG was descriptive of a service that located and
summarized blog posts related to a user’s search inquiry.79 The court
reversed the Board’s determination that the mark was descriptive with
respect to those services, finding instead that it was merely suggestive.80
In December 2006, Driven Innovations, Inc. (“Driven”) filed an “intent
to use” application for the mark DOTBLOG.81 In August 2007, the
USPTO approved the application and issued a notice of allowance.82 On
October 5, 2012, a new examining attorney reviewed a statement of use
filed by Driven that year and refused registration.83 The refusal was based
2.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

In re Magnesita Refractories Co., 2017 WL 5664747, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
674 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 996.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 996–97.
Id. at 997.
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on a finding that DOTBLOG was descriptive of the services claimed
because “the applicant [was] providing specific information to customers
with respect to information and key terms on blogs.”84
Driven responded that the refusal was procedurally improper
because an earlier examining attorney approved the mark and the new
examining attorney misapplied the clear error standard.85 Driven
further argued that the refusal was incorrect on the merits because the
mark was suggestive.86 The examining attorney issued a second Office
Action on April 25, 2013, maintaining the refusals, and Driven
responded by repeating its arguments, only to receive a final refusal.87
On appeal, the TTAB found that DOTBLOG was descriptive because
“each component [of the mark had] retained its character as merely
descriptive or without trademark significance in relation to the
services, and . . . the composite term does not present a new meaning
that is not itself merely descriptive.”88 The TTAB also noted that
consumers would “immediately understand” DOTBLOG to describe “a
website that may feature information for blogs, or be related to blogs,
regardless of the domain in which the blogs reside.”89 It also found
that the mark was descriptive because of a forthcoming .blog generic
top-level domain, reasoning that “consumers would perceive the mark
as conveying the impression of ‘providing specific information’ from
searches of sites on the ‘.blog’ domain.”90
The Federal Circuit disagreed and noted that descriptiveness is not
analyzed in the abstract but rather “in relation to the particular goods
for which registration is sought.”91 Analyzing the mark in this manner,
the court found that “the definitions of ‘dot’ and ‘blog’ d[id] not

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. In re Driven Innovations, Inc., 115 U.S.P.Q.2d 1261, 1267 (T.T.A.B. 2015),
rev’d, 674 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
89. Id. The Board concluded that the examining attorney’s reliance on sections 1,
2, 3, and 45 to refuse registration was in error, but considered these arguments as
further support for refusal under section 2(e)(1). Id. at 1268. Driven acknowledged
at oral argument before the Federal Circuit that it would not pursue a formal
procedural challenge of these findings. In re Driven Innovations, Inc., 674 F. App’x at
997.
90. In re Driven Innovations, Inc., 115 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1268 (explaining that when
combining the activation of the .blog with DOTBLOG’s services, users would understand
that the mark provides information from searching websites on the .blog domain).
91. In re Driven Innovations, Inc., 674 F. App’x at 998 (citation omitted).
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provide sufficient support for the Board’s finding under a substantial
evidence standard” because neither dot nor blog would “immediately
convey” or “immediately describe” the online nature of Driven’s
services or the relationship of its services to blogs.92 The court further
noted that the Board’s reasoning was problematic because it would
result in a refusal to register any marks where the claimed goods or
services had any relation to blogs.93
Descriptiveness: In re North Carolina Lottery
In In re North Carolina Lottery,94 the Federal Circuit agreed with the TTAB’s
determination that the mark FIRST TUESDAY is merely descriptive;95 thus,
the TTAB’s refusal to register the mark was warranted.96
North Carolina Lottery (“N.C. Lottery”) is a state agency that has
operated traditional lottery drawing games and instant lottery scratchoff games in North Carolina since 2006.97 To maintain customer
interest in its games, N.C. Lottery introduced new scratch-off games on
the first Tuesday of each month.98 It also claimed to use the mark
FIRST TUESDAY continuously on its print materials, website, and
point-of-sale displays since July 2013.99
On October 1, 2014, N.C. Lottery applied to register the FIRST
TUESDAY mark for “lottery cards,” “scratch cards for playing lottery
games,” and “lottery services.”100 In support of its registration, N.C.
Lottery submitted promotional materials along with explanatory text
detailing new scratch-offs available each month.101
The examining attorney denied the application because he
determined that the promotional materials merely described an aspect
of N.C. Lottery’s goods and services—that on the first Tuesday of each
month the new scratch-offs would be available.102
The TTAB affirmed the examiner’s refusal, reasoning that the
promotional materials made it clear that new scratch-off games would
3.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 999.
Id. at 1000.
866 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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be offered every first Tuesday of the month.103 The materials therefore
required no mental leap or multi-step reasoning process to reach a
conclusion as to the nature of the goods and services involved.104
N.C. Lottery appealed, arguing that the TTAB erred as a matter of law
by relying on the explanatory text of the specimens to supplement the
meaning of the mark itself.105 N.C. Lottery believed the TTAB should
have instead limited the inquiry to what a general consumer would know
about N.C. Lottery’s goods and services and would immediately
understand the mark to mean without additional context.106
The Federal Circuit analyzed N.C. Lottery’s claim in two parts. It
first discussed whether the Board erred in considering the explanatory
text when analyzing descriptiveness. The second part of the analysis
discussed whether there was substantial evidence to support the
Board’s conclusion that the mark was descriptive.
In the first instance, N.C. Lottery argued that explanatory text in its
specimens could not supply additional meaning to a mark because the
mark itself did not convey that meaning; therefore, the Board should
have considered the mark without the explanatory text.107 However, the
court agreed with the USPTO’s position that the Board was required to
consider the mark in its commercial context in order to determine the
public’s perception. It refused to cut the explanatory text from the
promotional materials when assessing commercial context.108
The court did not go so far as to say that the use of explanatory text
with a mark automatically renders the mark merely descriptive.
Instead it explained that a mark’s distinctiveness in the context of
explanatory text is a case-specific analysis.109 However, the court found
that the Board in this case was correct in considering the explanatory
text of the specimens to assess descriptiveness of the mark.
N.C. Lottery next argued that because it needed to explain the
connection between the mark and goods and services offered, the
explanatory text was evidence that the mark was not descriptive.110 It

103. In re N.C. Lottery, No. 86411401, 2016 WL 4140920, at *3 (T.T.A.B. 2016),
aff’d, 866 F.3d 1363.
104. Id.
105. In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d at 1367.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1368.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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cited two cases, Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer 111 and Swatch AG v. Beehive
Wholesale, LLC,112 as examples in which courts have relied on explanatory
text to find a mark was not descriptive.113 The Federal Circuit
distinguished the two cases on the grounds that connecting the
TUMBLEBUS and SWAP marks to their services and products required
a greater mental leap than connecting FIRST TUESDAY to when new
scratch-offs are being offered.114 In other words, there was less of a
mental leap between understanding that FIRST TUESDAY refers to a
new good or service being offered on the first Tuesday of a new month
than what was required in Tumblebus and Swatch.
In agreeing with the USPTO that substantial evidence supported the
Board’s finding of mere descriptiveness, the court concluded that the
mark FIRST TUESDAY did not identify the source of goods or services
as much as it described a feature or characteristic of those goods or
services.115 The commercial context in this case demonstrated that “a
consumer would immediately understand the intended meaning of
FIRST TUESDAY” because the explanatory text accompanying the
mark was straightforward and simple.116
Disclaimer Requirement: In re DDMB, Inc.
In In re DDMB, Inc.,117 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s
decision requiring an applicant to disclaim all words in the applied-for
mark—EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR and its accompanying design—or
face rejection of its application on the basis that the mark was merely
descriptive of the applicant’s services.118
DDMB, Inc. applied to register the mark119 in connection with
“providing video and amusement arcade services” in Class 41 and “bar
services [and] bar services featuring snacks” in Class 43.120 The
examining attorney refused registration on the ground that the terms
EMPORIUM and ARCADE BAR were merely descriptive and therefore
must be disclaimed.121 DDMB agreed to disclaim ARCADE BAR but
4.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

399 F.3d 754 (6th Cir. 2005).
739 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2014).
In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d at 1368.
Id.
Id. at 1369.
Id. (emphasis added).
681 F. App’x 919 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 923.
See infra Figure 1.
In re DDMB, 681 F. App’x at 920.
Id.
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not EMPORIUM.122 The examining attorney issued a final refusal, and
DDMB appealed the decision to the Board, which affirmed.123

Figure 1: DDMB, Inc. Proposed Mark
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s determination
that EMPORIUM was merely descriptive of DDMB’s services and
concluded that the decision was supported by substantial evidence.124
The court asserted three reasons for its decision: (1) dictionary evidence
indicated that the word “emporium” encompassed a variety of
commercial activities, including those listed in the application;
(2) additional dictionary evidence featured as an example of the word’s
usage in the phrase “pizza emporium” contradicted DDMB’s argument
that goods and services purchased in an emporium were not to be
consumed on site; and (3) third-party registrations of marks disclaimed
the term “emporium” for restaurant, catering, and bar services.125
The court also agreed that substantial evidence negated DDMB’s
argument that EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR was a unitary mark such
that EMPORIUM was arbitrary as used.126 In reaching this conclusion,
the court approved the Board’s rejection of DDMB’s argument that it
created an “incongruous redundancy” when it placed EMPORIUM in
front of ARCADE BAR because the two terms had similar meanings.127
Here, the court agreed with the Board’s reasoning that EMPORIUM
did not overlap with BAR because the words are not synonyms.128

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 921–22.
125. Id. at 922.
126. See id. (viewing the inseparability of the terms in “EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR”
as substantial evidence supporting the mark’s unitary nature).
127. See id. (specifying that, since the terms “emporium” and “bar” are not
synonymous, they do not overlap to the point of rendering the use of “emporium”
arbitrary).
128. Id.
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Similarly, the EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR was not a unitary mark
because the mark as a whole did not take on an independent meaning
separate from its constituent parts, as DDMB contended.129
Finally, although not addressed by the Board, the court noted that
DDMB undermined its position that EMPORIUM did not describe its
services by agreeing to disclaim ARCADE BAR as descriptive and then
arguing that EMPORIUM was redundant of that term.130 Accordingly,
the court affirmed the Board’s decision.131 DDMB subsequently agreed
to disclaim EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR and the mark was registered.
5. Primarily Merely a Surname: Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc.
In Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc.,132 the Federal Circuit vacated
and remanded the Board’s decision that the mark EARNHARDT
COLLECTION was not primarily merely a surname.133 The Federal
Circuit found that the Board’s opinion was unclear as to whether
COLLECTION was merely descriptive in the context of the applicant’s
goods and services.134
The appellee, Kerry Earnhardt, is the son of the late Dale Earnhardt, a
famous race car driver. Kerry is also the stepson of the appellant, Theresa
Earnhardt, Dale’s widow.135 Kerry Earnhardt’s company, Kerry Earnhardt,
Inc. (“KEI”), used the mark EARNHARDT COLLECTION as a lifestyle
brand and licensed that mark for use in connection with construction
services.136 Theresa Earnhardt owned several trademark registrations for
and the associated common law rights in trademarks containing DALE
EARNHARDT in connection with various goods and services.137
KEI filed a trademark application for the EARNHARDT
COLLECTION mark for use in connection with furniture in Class 20 and
custom construction of homes in Class 37.138 Theresa Earnhardt opposed
the application, arguing that consumers were likely to confuse the
applied-for mark with her registered marks.139 She also asserted that the
129. Id.
130. Id. at 923.
131. Id.
132. 864 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
133. Id. at 1376.
134. See id. at 1380 (finding it unclear whether the Board employed a
descriptiveness or genericness inquiry in evaluating the term COLLECTION).
135. Id. at 1376.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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applied-for mark ran afoul of section 2(e)(4) of the Lanham Act because
EARNHARDT COLLECTION was primarily merely a surname and
therefore not registrable without proof of acquired distinctiveness.140 The
Board dismissed the opposition, concluding that Theresa Earnhardt had
not established a likelihood of confusion between her marks and the
applied-for mark.141 Moreover, the Board determined that the mark was
not primarily merely a surname because the addition of the term
COLLECTION diminished the surname significance of EARNHARDT
and COLLECTION was not the “common descriptive or generic name
for KEI’s goods and services.”142 Theresa Earnhardt appealed to the
Federal Circuit on the surname issue.143
On appeal, the Federal Circuit began by noting that “[a] mark is
primarily merely a surname” if, from the general public’s perspective,
the significance of the mark emanates primarily from the surname.144
Because both parties admitted that EARNHARDT was a surname, the
issue turned on where the term COLLECTION fell on the
distinctiveness scale with respect to KEI’s goods and services.145 If the
term was suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful, then the primary
significance of the mark as a whole would not be that of a surname.146
If, on the other hand, the term was generic or descriptive, the overall
impression of EARNHARDT COLLECTION would be of a surname.147
Theresa Earnhardt contended that, while the Board had clearly
concluded that the term COLLECTION was not generic, it did not
address whether that term was merely descriptive of KEI’s goods.148
The Federal Circuit agreed that the Board’s opinion was unclear as to
whether it conducted the proper inquiry into whether the
COLLECTION element was merely descriptive.149 As a result, the
court vacated and remanded the case to the Board with instructions to
clarify its analysis regarding whether the term was merely descriptive

140. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4) (2012) (providing that a mark is not
registrable if it is “primarily merely a surname”).
141. Earnhardt, 864 F.3d at 1377.
142. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
143. Id.
144. See id. (citing In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
145. Id. at 1377, 1380.
146. See id. at 1377–78 (identifying distinctiveness of the second term in a mark to
be instructive as to whether the first term is a surname).
147. See id.
148. Id. at 1379.
149. Id. at 1380.
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of furniture and custom home construction.150
Trade Dress: Industrial Models, Inc. v. SNF, Inc.
In Industrial Models, Inc. v. SNF, Inc.,151 the Federal Circuit affirmed a
grant of summary judgment of non-infringement of trade dress because
the non-movant, SNF, Inc., failed to carry its burden.152 Specifically, the
court concluded that SNF, Inc., was unable to show that the alleged
trade dress was non-functional and was likely to be confused with the
allegedly infringing product.153 The Federal Circuit also affirmed the
award of attorneys’ fees to the movant, Industrial Models.154
Industrial Models entered the market for fiberglass utility bodies for use
in trucks.155 SNF, Inc., and other entities—collectively “the SNF
entities”156—sued Industrial Models, alleging, inter alia, that Industrial
Models’s fiberglass utility bodies infringed their trade dress.157 When the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted Industrial
Models’s motion for summary judgment for declaratory judgment of noninfringement of trade dress, the SNF entities appealed.158
The Federal Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s grant of
Under 15 U.S.C.
summary judgment to Industrial Models.159
§ 1125(a)(1), an individual who uses “any word, term, name, symbol,
or device” that is likely to be confused with another’s established trade
dress, with respect “to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods,” shall be subject to liability.160 The court noted that the
Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to grant trade dress rights
to unregistered trademarks in product design if the product is shown
to be distinctive and non-functional and likely to cause confusion with
the product for which protection is sought.161 The party asserting trade

6.

150. Id. at 1381.
151. Nos. 2017-1172, 2017-1173, 2017 WL 5152159 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 7, 2017).
152. Id. at *8.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at *1.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *2. The Federal Circuit also addressed antitrust claims brought against
the SNF entities by Industrial Models and Industrial Models’s Motion for Attorneys’
Fees relating to the SNF entities’ claims for patent and copyright infringement. Id. at
*3–6. Those issues are beyond the scope of this Summary and will not be discussed.
158. Id. at *7.
159. Id. at *3.
160. Id. at *7 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012)).
161. Id.
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dress infringement bears the burden of proving that the matter sought
to be protected is distinctive and non-functional.162
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment because the SNF entities failed to present any evidence that
the claimed trade dress was non-functional and instead relied on bare
assertions that the claimed features were aesthetic.163 Although the lack
of non-functionality evidence alone was sufficient for the court to affirm
the grant of summary judgment, the Federal Circuit noted an additional
ground to support the district court’s decision: the SNF entities
conceded they provided no evidence of likelihood of confusion between
the claimed trade dress and the allegedly infringing products.164
Next, the Federal Circuit considered whether the district court abused
its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees to Industrial Models.165 The
court noted that the proper standard for evaluating if the case was
exceptional—and therefore whether attorneys’ fees were appropriate—
under trade dress law was the same standard used for patent cases:
whether the case stands out by virtue of the strength of a party’s position
or whether the case was litigated unreasonably.166 Under the framework,
the Federal Circuit agreed that an award of attorneys’ fees was appropriate
because the SNF entities provided only bare assertions of nonfunctionality and presented no evidence of likelihood of confusion.167
Likelihood of Confusion: In re Latindo
In In re Latindo,168 the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision
to deny registration of the mark SENSI after conducting a likelihood
of confusion analysis.169 The court held, overall, that the new mark was
7.

162. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (“In a civil action for trade dress
infringement . . . , the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of
proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.”)).
163. See id. (citing Indus. Models, Inc. v. SNF, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-689-A, 2016 WL
4533321, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2016), aff’d, No. 2017-1172, 2017 WL 5152159 (Fed.
Cir. Nov. 7, 2017)) (finding persuasive the District Court’s determination that the SNF
entities failed to identify more than “‘the overall shape, profile, and appearance’ of
the utility bodies”).
164. Id.
165. Id. at *8.
166. Id. at *7 (citing Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1749, 1756 (2014)). For further discussion on the implications of deeming a case
exceptional, see supra Section I.C.
167. Indus. Models, Inc., 2017 WL 5152159, at *8.
168. No. 2017-1292, 2017 WL 5256285 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 13, 2017) (per curiam).
169. Id. at *3.
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confusingly similar to SENSI-CARE, an older mark.170
P.T. Arista Latindo (“Arista”) filed a trademark application based on
an intent to use SENSI with goods in several classes, including
Class 5.171 The examining attorney refused to register the mark in
relation to the Class 5 goods under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act
“because of [its] likelihood of consumer confusion . . . with two
previously registered marks.”172 The marks at issue owned by Convatec
are as follows: (1) SENSI-CARE in standard characters for “medicated
skin care preparations, namely, protectants for the prevention of skin
irritation and preparations for the treatment and prevention of diaper
rash,”173 and (2) the stylized version174 for “[s]kin protectant
preparations, namely, medicated skin care preparations; preparations
for protecting the skin from irritation, namely, pharmaceutical skin
lotions; preparations for treatment and prevention of diaper rash,
namely, medicated diaper rash ointments and lotions.”175
Figure 2: Arista Proposed Mark

Arista appealed to the TTAB, arguing that (1) “the marks were
dissimilar”; (2) “the goods were unrelated”; and (3) “there were no
actual instances of consumer confusion.”176 In response to Arista’s
arguments, the Board assessed the relevant confusion factor introduced
in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.177 and determined that the goods—
diapers and diaper rash cream—were related and sold through similar
channels and that the classes of customers were similar to both Arista
and Convatec.178 Analyzing the totality of the circumstances, the Board
170. Id. at *1, *3.
171. See id. at *1 (identifying Arista’s Class 5 goods as “adult and baby diapers and
diaper inserts” and pointing out that a trademark application based on the intent-touse for a mark is filed under section 1(b) of the Lanham Act).
172. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012)).
173. See id. (identifying the mark under Registration No. 2,618,533).
174. See infra Figure 2.
175. See In re Latindo, 2017 WL 5256285, at *1 (alteration in original) (identifying
the mark under Registration No. 3,640,455).
176. Id. The TTAB only addressed Arista’s first two claims. The actual confusion
analysis, if any, was not presented in this case, and the Board did not reach any decision
based on that argument.
177. 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
178. In re Latindo, 2017 WL 5256285, at *1 (citing In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
476 F.2d at 1361 (specifying a non-exhaustive list of thirteen factors, which are known
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determined that the marks were similar and “that there was a high
likelihood of confusion with the previously registered marks” to affirm
the rejection of Arista’s mark.179
On appeal, Arista did not dispute the similarity in sound and meaning,
the close relation of the goods, or “that the channels of trade and classes
of customers [were] similar.”180 Rather, Arista argued that there was a
different connotation and commercial impression regarding the mark
because consumers, when considering SENSI in the context of the
website, would assume the mark meant sensible versus Convatec’s use of
the mark to refer to sensitive.181 In the end, Arista claimed the Board erred
in refusing to consider the extrinsic evidence of Arista’s tagline.182
In rejecting this argument, the Federal Circuit held that only the
evidence “in the application and cited registration, not extrinsic evidence, . . .
determines likelihood of confusion.”183 In other words, the Board must
only compare the mark found in a prior registration with the mark in the
application at issue. Accordingly, an applicant cannot rely on how a mark
is displayed in commerce “to prove that the commercial impressions are
different” because trade dress is easily changed.184
Arista’s attempt to use Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC 185
to support its utilization of extrinsic evidence in assessing likelihood of
confusion was thwarted by the Federal Circuit, which found that Arista
misread Coach.186 In particular, the court and the Board in Coach
considered differences in the goods and services in the application and
registration as opposed to extrinsic evidence when concluding that the
trademarks had different commercial impressions.187
As a last attempt, Arista argued that dictionary.com showed SENSI

as the “DuPont factors,” that are considered in light of evidence in the record to
evaluate likelihood of confusion)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at *2.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. Id. (citing Vornado, Inc. v. Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 724, 727 (C.C.P.A.
1968)).
185. 668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
186. In re Latindo, 2017 WL 5256285, at *3. The court in Coach found no likelihood
of confusion, even though the marks were identical, because the uses were inherently
different—one mark was for educational materials and the other was for a fashion
label. See Coach, 668 F.3d at 1360–61, 1371.
187. In re Latindo, 2017 WL 5256285, at *3.
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would be understood as sensible.188 However, the court found that
dictionary evidence was not helpful to Arista because dictionary.com
did not actually define SENSI, and noted only that sensible was
alphabetically nearby.189
Because there was nothing in Arista’s application indicating
“‘SENSI’ should be understood to mean ‘sensible’” and because Arista’s
slogan did not appear in the application, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the TTAB’s refusal to grant registration.190 The court found that
Arista’s application did not prove that the identical terms used by
Arista and Convatec had different definitions or made different
commercial impressions.191
Ownership: Lyons v. American College of Veterinary Sports
Medicine & Rehabilitation
In Lyons v. American College of Veterinary Sports Medicine &
Rehabilitation,192 the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision to
cancel an individual’s registration on the Supplemental Register.193
Despite the fact that the appellant was the first to use and register the
mark at issue, the court found that the mark was actually owned by her
former colleagues based on a three-factor indicia of ownership test.194
In 1999, the appellant, Sheila Lyons, started an organizing committee with
the goal of forming an accredited veterinary specialist organization for
treating animals.195 Upon Ms. Lyons’s suggestion, the committee used the
mark THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF VETERINARY SPORTS MEDICINE
AND REHABILITATION (“VETERINARY SPORTS”).196 In 2004, Ms.
Lyons was dismissed from the committee.197 Years later, the committee was
accredited by the American Veterinary Medical Association.198
In May of 2005, approximately one year after Ms. Lyons was dismissed
from the committee, she applied to register VETERINARY SPORTS in
connection with veterinary education services and eventually obtained a
8.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
859 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 366 (2017).
Id. at 1027, 1029, 1032.
See id. at 1029.
See id. at 1024.
See id. at 1024–25.
Id. at 1025.
Id.
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registration for the mark on the Supplemental Register.199 Just shy of
the five-year anniversary of the registration date, the committee, which
was still using VETERINARY SPORTS, petitioned to cancel Ms. Lyons’s
registration on the grounds of priority of use and likelihood of
confusion, misrepresentation of source, and fraud.200 Despite it not
being one of the grounds put forth by the committee, the Board
concluded that Ms. Lyons did not own the mark and found her
registration void ab initio.201 Ms. Lyons appealed to the Federal Circuit,
arguing that she had “continuously” used VETERINARY SPORTS since
1996, long before the committee began using it.202
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s legal
conclusions de novo.203 The court adopted the Board’s three-factor
test to determine ownership: “(1) the parties’ objective intentions or
expectations; (2) who the public associates with the mark; and (3) to
whom the public looks to stand behind the quality of goods or services
offered under the mark.”204
Using this three-factor framework, the court reviewed the Board’s
factual findings under the substantial evidence standard.205 First, the
court affirmed the Board’s determination that the parties objectively
manifested the collective intent that the entire team would form a
veterinary specialist organization that would use VETERINARY
SPORTS, not that Ms. Lyons would perform personal services under the
mark.206 There, the court approved of the Board’s refusal to give weight
to Ms. Lyons’s subjective intent.207 Second, the Federal Circuit agreed
with the Board’s conclusion that the public associated VETERINARY
SPORTS with the committee in part because Ms. Lyons only engaged in
“de minimis” use of the mark that did not qualify as “use in commerce,”
while the committee engaged in substantial use of the mark.208 Finally,
the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that the relevant public
199. Id.
200. Id. “The cancellation proceeding was suspended for almost three years”
because Ms. Lyons sued the American College of Veterinary Sports Medicine and
Rehabilitation for infringing her mark. Id. (citing Lyons v. Am. Coll. of Veterinary
Sports Med. & Rehab., Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 92, 98 (D. Mass. 2014)).
201. Id. at 1025–26.
202. Id. at 1028–29.
203. Id. at 1027.
204. Id. at 1029.
205. Id. at 1027, 1029.
206. Id. at 1030.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1030–31.

1378

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1355

looked to the committee, not Ms. Lyons, to stand behind the quality of
the educational and certification services associated with the mark
because the committee, not Ms. Lyons, had achieved accreditation from
the American Veterinary Medical Association.209
Thus, despite the fact that Ms. Lyons used the mark first, introduced
it to the committee, and registered it, the committee was the true owner
of VETERINARY SPORTS.210 As a result, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the Board’s decision to cancel Ms. Lyons’s trademark registration.211
CONCLUSION
Without question, the Federal Circuit’s 2017 decisions significantly
clarify the interpretation and implementation of the Lanham Act. But
in the wake of the Federal Circuit’s In re Brunetti decision, it remains to
be seen whether the feared “smut-bath”212 of applications sullies the
marketplace or empowers bold expression. As the Federal Circuit
acknowledged, “[f]or immoral or scandalous marks, [the] message is
often uncouth. But [such marks] can espouse a powerful cause.”213
Nonetheless, given the essence of trademarks as trusted identifiers in
a marketplace of options, the enduring wisdom of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes seem to support the Federal Circuit’s further freeing
of expression for trademarks this year:
[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and . . . we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe . . . , unless they so imminently threaten . . .
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check
is required to save the country.214

209. Id. at 1031–32.
210. Id. at 1032.
211. See id.
212. Hugh Hansen, Symposium: Most Important Free Speech Case in Many Years,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 22 2017, 11:52 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/
symposium-important-free-speech-case-many-years.
213. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (discussing examples of
vulgarity used in the service of powerful causes, including FUCK HEROIN, Application
No. 86,361,326; FUCK CANCER, Application No. 86,290,011; FUCK RACISM,
Application No. 85,608,559).
214. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(stating further that “truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution[, which] . . . is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment . . . [and] we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be
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To be sure, as Justice Holmes acknowledged, trusting in the power of
the truth is an experiment, but “the theory of our Constitution . . . is
[also] an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”215 We look forward
to seeing how the results unfold.

fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country”).
215. Id. at 630.

